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Abstract
This paper develops a product-cycle model with costly technology transfer, which requires re-
sources from both the North and the South. In the basic model , we show that strengthening IPR
protection induces a large technology transfer and narrows the North{South wage gap. However, we
obtain an ambiguous result regarding the eect on economic growth, which depends crucially on the
size of the transfer cost. Although strengthening IPR protection induces a high growth rate when the
transfer cost is small, it can induce a low growth rate when the transfer cost is large. In the extended
model, in order to examine what factors determine the transfer cost, we consider the situation where
the Southern rms may misbehave and the Northern rms incur a cost to monitor them. We show
that the degree of investor protection and the degree of morality in developing countries inuence the
size of the transfer cost, which aects economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Since a range of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which requires
developing countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to establish minimum
standards of intellectual property right (IPR) protection, were signed in the Uruguay Round, many
studies have analyzed the eects of strengthening IPR protection in developing countries. These studies
typically construct a model consistent with the product cycle, as highlighted in Vernon (1966). New
goods are invented and production takes place initially in high-wage developed countries. Subsequently,
production shifts to low-wage developing countries, accompanied by technology transfer. Technology
diuses from developed countries to developing countries through many channels. Regardless of the
channels, technology transfer involves substantial resource cost in both countries. For example, when
technology transfer takes place through foreign direct investment (FDI), aliates receiving technology
will typically need to conduct R&D to absorb the technology and to modify it for the local market 1,
and multinational rms will need to train workers in developing countries and to acquire knowledge
about foreign customs and regulations. When technology transfer takes place through licensing, there
is a negotiation cost incurred to establish an agreement. However, many theoretical papers ignore the
cost of technology transfer. In particular, no study has considered that technology transfer involves a
resource cost in both developed countries and developing countries. This paper, therefore, develops a
product-cycle model with costly technology transfer, which requires resource use in both developed and
developing countries.
We assume that there are two countries in the world, the North and the South. New goods are
invented in the North, and inventors of the new good can earn a prot ow because they are protected
by perfect IPR protection in the North. They have an incentive to transfer technology to the South in
order to produce goods using Southern labor, whose wage is relative low. However they suer from a
one-o imitation risk and transfer cost. These trade-os determine the amount of technology transfer in
the equilibrium.
Then we analyze the eect of strengthening IPR protection. Strengthening IPR protection (decreasing
imitation risk) induces a large technology transfer and narrows the North{South wage gap. Strengthen-
ing IPR protection reduces imitation risk, which decreases the disadvantage of transferring technology.
1Fors (1997) presented evidence that multinationals spend substantial amounts on R&D performed abroad.
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Then, more inventors are willing to transfer technology, and more production shifts to the South, which
induces increased demand for Southern labor. This reduces the North{South wage gap. These results
are consistent with models in related studies in which technology diuses through FDI or licensing. How-
ever, we obtain ambiguous results regarding the eect on economic growth. Although strengthening
IPR protection induces a high growth rate when the transfer cost is small, strengthening IPR protection
can induce a low growth rate when the transfer cost is large. Strengthening IPR protection induces a
production shift to the South, which is accompanied by a technology transfer. On the one hand, more
production takes place in the South, which makes Northern resources shift from production to R&D
activities, which promotes economic growth. On the other hand, more technology transfer takes place,
which requires Northern resources. The resources used in R&D will shift to the transfer activities, which
impedes economic growth. If the former (latter) eect dominates the latter (former) eect, strengthening
IPR protection promotes (harms) economic growth.
Then what factors determine the transfer cost, which plays a key role in our model? In the real world,
it depends not only on the characteristics of the rms in the developed country such as the ability to
conduct adaptive R&D and to accumulate knowledge, but also on the characteristics of the host countries
such as the legal system, education level and morals of Southern workers. Specically, entrepreneurs may
misbehave and the Northern rms must monitor their behaviors so that they do not misbehave in countries
with weaker investor protection or lower morality. Then we extend the basic model by introducing the
framework of contract theory in order to examine how weaker investor protection or lower morality aect
transfer cost and consequently economic growth.
We assume that for rms in developed countries to shift production to developing countries, it is
necessary to cooperate with entrepreneurs in the developing countries, and that entrepreneurs have an
incentive to enjoy private benets by misbehaving. These private benets depend on the degree of investor
protection, the morals of workers in developing countries, and the monitoring by the rms transferring the
technology. When the degree of investor protection and the morals of laborers are low, private benets
are high. However rms can reduce the private benets of entrepreneurs by monitoring, which involves
a resource cost. Although the characteristics of host countries are not so important when the degree
of investor protection and the morals of laborers are suciently high, they have a crucial eect on the
transfer cost when the degree of investor protection and the morals of laborers are low because rms must
2
monitor entrepreneurs to ensure that they do not misbehave. The transfer cost is high if the degree of
investor protection and the morals of laborers in the host country are low. In this situation, strengthening
IPR protection impedes economic growth. This result implies that strengthening IPR protection does not
promote R&D in all developed countries but rather depends on the characteristics of the host countries.
This paper develops a product-cycle model where the channel of technology transfer is FDI or licens-
ing. Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001), Glass and Wu (2007), Tanaka, Iwaisako and Futagami (2007),
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011), and Tanaka and Iwaisako (2014) con-
structed such a model. Most of these papers showed that strengthening IPR protection induces a large
technology transfer, narrows the North{South wage gap and produces a high growth rate.2 Our paper
shows that the eect of strengthening IPR protection on the growth rate is ambiguous when we con-
sider the role of costly transfer activities. Some papers have considered costly technology transfer. In
the context of illegal imitation models, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Mondal and Gupta (2007,
2009) assumed that illegal imitation as a channel of technology transfer is costly and requires Southern
labor. In the context of licensing, Yang and Maskus (2001) and Tanaka, Iwaisako and Futagami (2007)
assumed that rms incur negotiation cost to obtain licensing agreements, which is reduced by strength-
ening IPR protection. However, Yang and Maskus (2001) assumed that only Northern labor is needed
for negotiation, while Tanaka, Iwaisako and Futagami (2007) assumed that only Southern labor is needed
in negotiation. In the context of FDI models, Dinopoulos, and Segerstrom (2010) assumed that rms
should conduct adoptive R&D to transfer technology, which requires only Southern labor. Our model
generalizes these papers such that transfer activities require both Northern and Southern labor. Moreover
we guarantee that comparative statistic of our generalized model is meaningful to show that the interior
equilibrium is always saddle stable when transfer activity requires both Northern labor and Southern
labor.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and derives the
equilibrium. Section 3 describes the extended model. Section 4 provides concluding comments.
2There is another category of product-cycle model in which technology transfer occurs through illegal imitation. Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Arnold (2002), Mondal and Gupta (2007, 2009) and Akiyama and Furukawa
(2009) constructed such a model. Most of these papers showed that strengthening IPR protection induces small technology
transfers, widens the North{South wage gap and reduces the economic growth rate. Glass and Saggi (2002) and Parello
(2008) developed hybrid models in which technology transfers occur through both FDI and illegal imitation.
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2 Basic model
2.1 Setting
There are two countries in the world, the North and the South. Both country's populations are exogenous
given MN and MS , respectively, and do not grow. They are linked by free international trade in
dierentiated goods. We consider the parameter values so that the wage rate of the North is higher
than that of the South. Only the North has a research sector; therefore, new dierentiated goods are
invented only in the North. Inventors of the new goods are protected by perfect IPR protection in the
North however are protected by imperfect IPR protection in the South. Northern rms can shift their
production to the South and use the Southern labor. However they are exposed to the risk of being
imitated due to the imperfect protection in the South.
2.1.1 Households
We construct an innite representative agent model. Household members live forever and are endowed
with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically. Each household maximizes its discounted utility:
U =
1Z
0
exp( t) lnu(t)dt; (1)
where  is the subjective discount rate and u(t) is the instantaneous utility per person at time t, which
is given by
u(t) =
8><>:
n(t)Z
0
[x (z; t)]
" 1
" dz
9>=>;
"
" 1
; (2)
where x(z; t) is consumption of dierentiated goods in industry z in period t, " > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution of dierentiated goods, and n(t) is the available variety of dierentiated goods in period t,
which increases through R&D activity. From (2), the demand function for the product in industry z in
period t is given by
x(z; t) =
p(z; t) "
n(t)R
0
p(; t)1 "d
E (t) ; (3)
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where p(z; t) is the price of dierentiated goods in industry z in period t, and E(t) is aggregate world
consumption in period t. Given (3), intertemporal utility maximization yields
_E(t)
E(t)
= r(t)  ; (4)
where r(t) is the interest rate at time t.
2.1.2 Production
There are three types of rms producing goods: Northern rms, Multinational rms and Imitation rms.
Northern rms and Multinational rms supply goods monopolistically, and Imitation rms supply goods
competitively. Northern rms hire one Northern laborer to produce one good. Multinational rms and
Imitation rms hire one Southern laborer to produce one good. There are no xed costs or transport costs.
The instantaneous prots of Northern rms, Multinational rms and Imitation rms are expressed as
N (t) = xN (t)
 
pN (t)  wN (t), M (t) = xM (t)  pM (t)  wS (t) and I (t) = xI (t)  pI (t)  wS (t)
respectively, where xN (t), xM (t) and xI (t) are the outputs and pN (t), pM (t) and pI (t) are the prices
of Northern rms, Multinational rms and Imitation rms respectively, wN (t) is the wage rate of the
North, and wS (t) is the wage rate of the South. As Northern rms and Multinational rms supply goods
monopolistically, they choose the optimal price pN (t) = "" 1w
N (t), pM (t) = "" 1w
S (t) respectively. As
Imitation rms supply goods competitively, the price of Imitation rms is pI (t) = wS (t). Using (3), we
obtain:
xN (t) =

"
" 1
 "
nN (t)

"
" 1
1 "
+ nM (t)

"
" 1! (t)
1 "
+ nI (t) (! (t))
1 "
 (t) ; (5)
xM (t) =

"
" 1! (t)
 "
nN (t)

"
" 1
1 "
+ nM (t)

"
" 1! (t)
1 "
+ nI (t) (! (t))
1 "
 (t) ; (6)
xI (t) =
(! (t))
 "
nN (t)

"
" 1
1 "
+ nM (t)

"
" 1! (t)
1 "
+ nI (t) (! (t))
1 "
 (t) ; (7)
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where nN (t), nM (t) and nI (t) are the available variety of dierentiated goods produced by Northern
rms, Multinational rms and Imitation rms respectively in period t, ! (t)  wS(t)
wN (t)
is the relative wage
and  (t)  E(t)
wN (t)
. Substituting (5) and (6) into the prot function, we obtain relative instantaneous
prot as follows:
N (t)
M (t)
= (! (t))
" 1
: (8)
2.1.3 R&D activity
As inventors of new goods are protected by perfect IPR protection in the North, they can become Northern
monopolistic rms and earn prot ow. Then new rms undertake R&D activity. We assume that a new
rm must hire 1n(t) units of Northern labor to invent a new product.
3 Then the return from the R&D
activity is vN (t)   1n(t)wN (t), where vN (t) is the value of Northern rms in period t. Assuming free
entry into each R&D race, we obtain:
vN (t) =
wN (t)
n (t)
: (9)
Aggregating labor engaged in R&D yields the following dynamic equation of variety:
g (t)  _n (t)
n (t)
= HR (t) ; (10)
where HR (t) is aggregate labor engaged in R&D.
2.1.4 Technology transfer
Northern rms have an incentive to transfer technology to the South in order to produce goods using
Southern labor, whose wage is relative low. Producing goods at low cost allows these rms to earn large
prots, which is an advantage of technology transfer. However, they suer from a one-o imitation risk
and transfer cost, which are the disadvantages of technology transfer. As IPR protection in the South
is imperfect, the Northern rms can lose their prot ow with probability  because of imitation when
3We assume a simple setting in which the eciency of R&D is unity, a spillover occurs from the aggregate available
variable n(t) and there is no uncertainty.
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transferring their technology.4 That is, Northern rms succeed in transferring technology and become
Multinational rms with probability 1  , otherwise they lose prot ow, and goods are produced by the
Imitation rms in their industry with probability . Then _nM (t) = (1  ) _nS (t) and _nI (t) =  _nS (t)
are satised, where nS (t)  nM (t) + nI (t) is the variety produced by Southern labor. We additively
assume that transferring technology needs both Northern labor and Southern labor, and should satisfy
the following CES restriction:5
n (t)

b
 
hFN (t)
  1
 + (1  b)  hFS (t)  1   1  fF ; (11)
where hFN (t) is Northern labor engaged in technology transfer, hFS (t) is Southern labor engaged in
technology transfer,   0 is the elasticity of substitution between Northern labor and Southern labor,
1=fF is the eciency of technology transfer, b 2 [0; 1] is the degree of contribution of Northern labor.
They choose optimal hFN (t) and hFS (t) to minimize transfer cost cF (t)  wN (t)hFN (t)+wS (t)hFS (t)
subject to (11). Then we obtain:
hFN (t) =
1
n (t)
FFN (! (t)) ; FFN (! (t))  fF
"
(! (t))
 1
(b)
 1
(! (t))
 1
(b)

+ (1  b)
# 
 1
; (12)
hFS (t) =
1
n (t)
FFS (! (t)) ; FFS (! (t))  fF
"
(1  b) 1
(! (t))
 1
(b)

+ (1  b)
# 
 1
; (13)
cF (t) = vN (t)FFC (! (t)) ; FFC (! (t))  fF! (t)
h
(! (t))
 1
(b)

+ (1  b)
i  1 1
; (14)
which are functions of relative wage rate !. For the latter analysis, we check the properties of the
above function. First, dF
FN (!)
dfF
> 0; dF
FS(!)
dfF
> 0; dF
FC(!)
dfF
> 0 are satised, which means that low
eciency of technology transfer induces many Northern laborers and Southern laborers to engage in
technology transfer and makes the technology transfer costly. Second, dF
FN (!)
d! > 0;
dFFS(!)
d! < 0 and
4Related studies assumed that Multinational rms suer from Poisson imitation risk instead of a one-o imitation risk.
Although these studies use settings that are more realistic than ours, both settings play a similar role in the model, and
our setting makes analysis of the model easier. Then we adopt a one-o imitation risk.
5When the Northern rm transfers technology, on the one hand, they send their sta in order to provide the necessary
knowledge, such as how to manage Southern workers, etc. Then Northern labor is required. On the other hand, Southern
laborers must learn how to produce new goods, which requires time. Then Southern labor is required.
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dFFC(!)
d! > 0 are satised, which means that the high Southern wage, keeping the Northern wage constant,
induces many Northern laborers and few Southern laborers to engage in technology transfer and incurs
a large technology transfer cost. Third, dF
FC(!)
d < 0 is satised, which means that the low elasticity of
substitution between Northern labor and Southern labor induces a high transfer cost. Finally, FFC is
U-shaped with respect to the degree of contribution b.6
The expected gain from technology transfer is
 
(1  )vM (t)  vN (t)  cF (t) where vM (t) is the
value of Multinational rms and  2 [0; 1] is the prot share of Northern rms. If the expected gain from
technology transfer is strictly negative, Northern rms prefer not to transfer technology. If the expected
gain from technology transfer is strictly positive, transfer takes place, and the demand for Southern
labor increases. Then the North{South wage gap falls, which decreases the incentive to transfer. This
mechanism continues until the expected gain reaches zero.7 Therefore, when technology transfer takes
place, using (14):
vN (t)
vM (t)
=
(1  )
FFC (! (t)) + 1
(15)
is satised. Our assumption about the technological transfer cost is a generalization of that in related
studies. When fF = 0 and  = 1, our model reects the economy of Lai (1998). When fF > 0 and b = 1,
our model reects the economy of Yang and Maskus (2001). When fF > 0 and b = 0 and we interpret
 as the prot share of Southern licensed rms, our model reects the economy of Tanaka, Iwaisako and
Futagami (2007). When fF > 0, b = 0 and  = 1, our model reects the economy of Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010).
2.1.5 Labor market
Northern laborers are engaged in the production of Northern rms, R&D activity and technological
transfer. Northern labor supply is exogenously given. The labor market clearing condition in the North
is:
xN (t)nN (t) +HR (t) + _nS (t)hFN (t) =MN : (16)
6A high (low) b induces many Northern (Southern) laborers to engage in technology transfer. An increase in b means an
increase (decrease) in the eciency of Northern (Southern) labor. Thus when few (many) Northern laborers are engaged
in technology transfer, an increase in b induces an increase (decrease) in the transfer cost.
7We only focus on the case in which production takes place in both the North and South.
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Southern laborers are engaged in the production of Multinational rms and Imitation rms, and techno-
logical transfer. Southern labor supply is exogenously given. The labor market clearing condition in the
South is:
xM (t)nM (t) + xI (t)nI (t) + _nS (t)hFS (t) =MS : (17)
2.1.6 Asset market
When both stock of existing Northern rms and stock of existing Multinational rms are held, the return
on these stocks is equal, which is also equal in the return on riskless asset. The no-arbitrage condition
satises:
r (t) =
N (t) + _vN (t)
vN (t)
=
M (t) + _vM (t)
vM (t)
; (18)
where r(t) is the return on riskless asset at time t.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Transition Dynamics
From (10), (12), (13), (16) and (17), the dierential equation of the ratio of goods produced by Southern
labor to all produced goods  (t)  nS(t)n(t) is as follows:
_ (t) =
1 +  (t)FFN (! (t))
FFS (! (t))

MS  XS (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t)   (t) MN  XN (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t) :
(19)
, where   nI
nS
,XN (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t))  nN (t)xN (t)(t) =
(1 (t))( "" 1 )
 "
(1 (t))( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  (t))(t)( "" 1!(t))
1 "
+ (t)(t)(!(t))1 "
andXS (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t))  xM (t)nM (t)+xI(t)nI(t)(t) =
(1  (t))(t)( "" 1!(t))
 "
+ (t)(t)(!(t)) "
(1 (t))( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  (t))(t)( "" 1!(t))
1 "
+ (t)(t)(!(t))1 "
.8
9 We can conrm that @X
N (!;; )
@! > 0,
@XN (!;; )
@ < 0,
@XN (!;; )
@ < 0,
@XS(!;; )
@! < 0,
@XS(!;; )
@ > 0
8Dierentiating  (t) =
nS(t)
n(t)
, and substitutes (17) yields
_(t)
(t)
=
_nS(t)
nS(t)
  _n(t)
n(t)
= 1
(t)FFS(!(t))

MS  XS (t) (t) g (t).
From (10), (12), (13), (16) and (17), g (t) =  FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))

MS  XS (t) (t)+MN  XN (t) (t) is satised. Combining
these two equation yields (19).
9This dierentiated equation holds when fF > 0 and b 2 [0; 1) are satised.
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and @X
S(!;; )
@ > 0 are satised.
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From  (t) = n
I(t)
nS(t)
, (17) and _nI (t) =  _nS (t),
_ (t) =

MS  XS (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t)
FFS (! (t))  (t)

[    (t)] : (20)
is satised.11
From (4) (10), (12), (13), (16), (17) and (18),
_ (t)
 (t)
=
(1   (t)) ("  1) + 1
(1   (t)) ("  1) X
N (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t) MN + F
FN (! (t))
FFS (! (t))

MS  XS (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t)  :
(21)
is satised.12
From (8), (9), (15) and (18),
_! (t) =
XN (! (t) ;  (t) ;  (t)) (t)
(1   (t)) ("  1) @FFC(!(t))@!(t)
h
  (1  ) (! (t))1 " + FFC (! (t)) + 1
i
: (22)
is satised.13 14 Then this economy's dynamics are described by (19), (20), (21) and (22) in (;  ; ; !)
space.15
3.2 BGP equilivrium
In the following, we focus on the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium where g, ,  ,  and ! are
constants. First we describe the equilibrium North{South relative wage. From (22) and _!(t) = 0, we
10We conrm this in the appendix A1.
11Dierentiating  (t) =
nI (t)
nS(t)
yields
_ (t)
 (t)
=
_nI (t)
nI (t)
  _nS(t)
nS(t)
= 
_nS(t)
nS(t)
nS(t)
nI (t)
  _nS(t)
nS(t)
=
_nS(t)
nS(t)
h

 (t)
  1
i
. From (17),
_nS(t)
nS(t)
=
MS XS(!(t);(t); (t))(t)
FFS(!(t))(t)
is satised. Combining these two equation yields (20).
12Dierentiating  (t) =
E(t)
wN (t)
, and substitutes (4) and (18) yields
_(t)
(t)
=
_E(t)
E(t)
  _wN (t)
wN (t)
= r (t)      _vN (t)
vN (t)
  _n(t)
n(t)
=
N (t)
vN (t)
     g (t). From (10), (12), (13), (16) and (17), g (t) =  FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))

MS  XS (t) (t) +MN   XN (t) (t) is
satised. Combining these two equation yields (21).
13From (15),
_vN (t)
vN (t)
  _vM (t)
vM (t)
=  
@FFC (!(t))
@!(t)
_!(t)
FFC(!(t))+1
is satised. From (9) and N (t) = 1
" 1x
N (t)wN (t),
N (t)
vN (t)
=
XN (t)(t)
(1 (t))(" 1) is satised. From (8), (18) and
N (t)
vN (t)
=
XN (t)(t)
(1 (t))(" 1) ,
_vN (t)
vN (t)
  _vM (t)
vM (t)
=
M (t)
vM (t)
  N (t)
vN (t)
=
XN (t)(t)
(FFC(!(t))+1)(1 (t))(" 1)
h
(1  ) (! (t))1 "   FFC (! (t))  1
i
is satised. Combining above equations yields (22).
14This dierential equation holds when fF > 0 is satised. When fF = 0,
XN (!(t);(t); (t))(t)
(1 (t))(" 1)
h
(1  ) (! (t))1 "   1
i
= 0 is satised insted of (22).
15The interior equilibrium is saddle stable as shown in appendix A2.
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obtain:
(!)" 1

FFC (!) + 1

= (1  ): (23)
The North{South relative wage ! = w
S
wN
is determined by this equation. The relative wage is an increasing
function of ", ,  and a decreasing function of  and fF , which means that enhancing the transfer incentive
increases the relative wage. 16
Lemma 3.1. Strengthening IPR protection (decreasing ) and decreasing transferring cost (decreasing
fF ) narrow the North{South wage gap.
This lemma is consistent with the results of related studies such as Lai (1998), Tanaka, Iwaisako
and Futagami (2007), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011) and Tanaka and
Iwaisako (2014).
We can also describe equilibrium value of the ratio of goods produced by Imitation rm to goods
produced by Southern labor  easily. From (20) and _ (t) = 0, we obtain:
  = : (24)
Next we describe the equilibrium value of the growth rate g and production ratio . As _ (t) = 0 is
satised on the BGP equilibrium, we obtain:

_nS
n

= g: (25)
As _ (t) = 0 is satised on the BGP equilibrium, from (4), (9) and (18),
XN (!; ;  ) = (+ g) (1  ) ("  1) : (26)
is satised. 17
16As the high elasticity of substitution of dierentiated good " leads to a low price and high output (labor demand), the
incentive to hire lower wage labor is high. A high elasticity of substitution of the labor-hiring transfer activity  and a high
eciency of technology transfer result in a low transfer cost, which enhances the transfer incentive. Low imitation risk and
a high share of prot of Northern rms lead to a high expected return of technology transfer, which increases the transfer
incentive. As FFC (!) is inverse U-shaped with respect to the degree of contribution b, the relative wage is U-shaped with
respect to b.
17From (4) and (18), _ (t) = 0 yields
_(t)
(t)
=
_E(t)
E(t)
  _wN (t)
wN (t)
= r (t)    _vN (t)
vN (t)
  _n(t)
n(t)
=
N (t)
vN (t)
    g (t) = 0. From (9)
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Substituting (10), (12), (25) and (26) into (16) yields,
g =
MN   (1  ) ("  1) 
FFN (!) + 1 + (1  ) ("  1) : (27)
This equation depicts a two-dimensional N-curve whose vertical axis measures the growth rate g and
horizontal axis measures the production ratio  respectively. A rising  induces two eects on the N-
curve. The rst eect is through d(1 )(" 1)d < 0. This eect means that increasing the ratio of goods
produced by Southern labor decreases the ratio of goods produced by Northern labor, which increases
labor engaged in R&D and g. The second eect is through dF
FN (!)
d > 0. This eect means that
increasing the ratio of goods produced by Southern labor increases technology transfer, which increases
labor engaged in the transfer, which then decreases labor engaged in R&D and g. Therefore, the slope
of the N-curve is ambiguous. If FFN is small (large), this slope is positive (negative) because the second
eect is weak (strong).
Substituting (13), (25) and (26) into (17) yields,
g =
MS   XS(!;; )
XN (!;; ) (1  ) ("  1) 
FFS (!) + X
S(!;; )
XN (!;; ) (1  ) ("  1)
: (28)
This equation depicts an S-curve. Increasing  decreases g in the S-curve because dd
XS(!;; )
XN (!;; ) (1  ) ("  1) >
0 and dd F
FS (!) > 0 are satised. The S-curve is always downward sloping.
Then we can analyze the eect of strengthening IPR protection (decreasing imitation probability ).
First we consider the special case that FFN = 0 (b = 0) is satised. In this case, the N-curve is upward
sloping, which is depicted in Figure 1. On one hand, strengthening IPR protection has no eect on the
N-curve. On the other hand, this eect shifts the S-curve counter-clockwise from the solid line to the
broken line, and the equilibrium shifts to point B from point A.18 Then the ratio of goods produced by
Southern labor  and growth rate g increase, which is consistent with models in related studies in which
technology diuses through FDI or licensing. When FFN is suciently small, we get same result.
and N (t) = 1
" 1x
N (t)wN (t), 
N
vN
= X
N
(1 )(" 1) is satised. Combining these two equations yields (26).
18Since
@XN (!;; )
@!
> 0,
@XS(!;; )
@!
< 0, d!

d
< 0,
@XN (!;; )
@ 
< 0,
@XS(!;; )
@ 
> 0 and d 

d
> 0 are satised, we get
d
d

XS(!;; )
XN (!;; )

=
@
@!

XS (!; ;  )
XN (!; ;  )

| {z }
 
d!
d| {z }
 
+
@
@ 

XS (!; ;  )
XN (!; ;  )

| {z }
+
d 
d| {z }
+
> 0. Since
@FFS(!)
@! < 0 is satised,
we get
dFFS(!)
d
=
@FFS (!)
@!| {z }
 
d!
d| {z }
 
> 0. Therefore decreasing  shifts S-curve counter-clockwise.
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Lemma 3.2. When few Northern labor is needed for technology transfer (with small FFN ), strengthening
IPR protection (decreasing ) increase the ratio of goods produced in South  and growth rate g.
g

S-curve
N-curve
A
B
 = 1
MN (" 1)
"
MN
Figure 1. The eect of strengthening IPR protection when few Northern labor is needed for technology
transfer.
However, when FFN is large, this result changes. In this case, the N-curve is downward sloping, which
is depicted in Figure 2.19 On one hand, strengthening IPR protection shifts N-curve clockwise from the
solid line to the broken line.20 On the other hand, these eects shift the S-curve counter-clockwise from
the solid line to the broken line. Then the equilibrium shifts to point B from point A. Therefore the ratio
of goods produced by Southern labor  increases, however, growth rate g decreases.
Proposition 3.1. When many Northern labor is needed for technology transfer (with large FFN ),
strengthening IPR protection (decreasing ) induces a large technology transfer, and the ratio of goods
produced by Southern labor  increases. However, the growth rate, g, decreases.
19In Figure 2, the intersection of two curves is on the left to the  = 1 line. However, there is a possibility that the
intersection of two curves is on the right to the  = 1. In this case extreme point equilibrium, all production takes place in the
South, is realized. To ensure interior point equilibrium, M
N
FFN (!)+1 >
MS

"
" 1
 " (1 ) "
" 1!
 "+(!) "(" 1)
FFS(!)

"
" 1
 "
+

(1 )

"
" 1!
 "
+(!) "

(" 1)
should be satised. That is, FFN (!) should not be large relative to FFS (!) to get interior point equilibrium.
20Note that
dFFN (!)
d
=
@FFN (!)
@!| {z }
+
d!
d| {z }
 
< 0 is satised.
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g
S-curve
N-curve
A
B
 = 1
MN (" 1)
"
MN
FFN (!)+1
Figure 2. The eect of strengthening IPR protection when many Northern labor is needed for
technology transfer.
Finally we examine the eect of an improvement of technology transfer eciency (decreasing fF ).
When FFN = 0 (b = 0) is satised, an improvement of technology transfer eciency has no eect on
the N-curve, however, shifts the S-curve counter-clockwise from the solid line to the broken line, and
the equilibrium shifts to point B from point A as shown in Figure 1. Then the ratio of goods produced
by Southern labor  and growth rate g increase.21 When FFN > 0 (b > 0), this eect is ambiguous.
However we can conrm that an improvement of technology transfer eciency induces high growth rate
if N-curve is positive and dF
FN (!)
dfF
=
@FFN (!)
@!| {z }
+
d!
dfF|{z}
 
+
@FFN (!)
@fF| {z }
+
 0 is satised. This is depicted
in Figure 3.22
21Since
dFFS(!)
dfF
=
@FFS (!)
@!| {z }
 
d!
dfF| {z }
 
+
@FFS (!)
@fF| {z }
+
> 0 is satised, a decreasing fF shifts S-curve counter-clockwise.
22If
dFFN (!)
dfF
 0 is satised, N-curve shifts counter-clockwise.
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N-curve
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B
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"
Figure 3. The eect of an improvement of technology transfer eciency when few Northern labor is
needed for technology transfer.
4 Extended model
In the previous section, we showed that the eect of strengthening IPR protection on the growth rate
depends crucially on the transfer cost, which is a function of the eciency of technology transfer fF . This
parameter summarizes many factors such as the experience of Northern rms, the degree of globalization,
the environments of host countries, etc. In this section, we focus on the characteristics of the host coun-
tries. Then we introduce a moral hazard framework following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Antras,
Desai and Foley (2009). In this setting, when Northern rms transfer their technology to the South, they
need to cooperate with Southern entrepreneurs, who have no protable opportunity except for cooper-
ation with Northern rms. However, they cannot fully control Southern entrepreneurs; therefore, they
have to contract with Southern entrepreneurs. After technology is transferred, Southern entrepreneurs
choose to behave or to misbehave. When Southern entrepreneurs choose to behave, the transfer suc-
ceeds with probability pH(1  ), and Southern entrepreneurs enjoy no private benets. When Southern
entrepreneurs choose to misbehave, the transfer succeeds with probability pL(1   ), and the Southern
entrepreneurs enjoy private benets.23 For simplicity, we assume that pH = 1 and pL = 0.24 Following
23Private benets are interpreted as perquisites for the Southern entrepreneurs associated with leaking technology, di-
verting funds, doing careless work, making less eort, etc.
24This assumption enables us to focus only on the case in which Northern rms ensure that Southern entrepreneurs do
not misbehave; then, Southern entrepreneurs do not choose to misbehave in equilibrium.
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Antras, Desai and Foley (2009), we also assume that the private benets of Southern entrepreneurs are
proportional to the value of Multinational rms and are inuenced by the investor protection in the South
and the monitoring by Northern rms. If the investor protection is strong, it is dicult for Southern
entrepreneurs to misbehave and enjoy private benets. Even if the investor protection is not suciently
strong, Northern rms can reduce the private benets of Southern entrepreneurs by monitoring, which
needs Northern labor. Severe monitoring by Northern rms also makes it dicult to obtain private
benets. Then, following Antras, Desai and Foley (2009), we specify the private benets of Southern
entrepreneurs as (1  ) (1  ) vM (t)C  hFN (t), where  is the degree of investor protection or moral-
ity in the host country, and C
 
hFN (t)

is the monitoring function, which satises
dC(hFN (t))
hFN
< 0. For
simplicity, we specify the monitoring function as C
 
hFN (t)

= 1
aMn(t)hFN (t)
, where n (t) is a spillover
and aM is the eciency of monitoring.
Then Northern rms choose the volume of employment engaged in technology transfer hFN (t), hFS (t)
and the share of the transfer cost  such that they maximize the transfer gain and Southern entrepreneurs
choose to behave. This optimal contract is given as follows:
max
hFN (t);hFS(t);
(1  )vM (t)  cF (t)
s:t: cF (t) = wNhFN (t) + wShFS (t)
n (t)

b
 
hFN (t)
  1
 + (1  b)  hFS (t)  1   1  fF
(1  ) (1  ) vM (t)  (1  ) cF (t)  0
(1  ) (1  ) vM (t)  (1  ) cF (t)  (1  ) (1  ) vM (t) 1
aMn(t)hFN (t)
  (1  ) cF (t)
(29)
The objective function is the transfer gain of Northern rms, which is the same as in the previous
section except for the presence of .25 The rst constraint is denition of cost function on technology
transfer. The second constraint is a resource constraint on technology transfer, which was used in the
previous section. The third constraint is the participation constraint of Southern entrepreneurs, given
that they have no other option for earning a prot. Southern entrepreneurs gain an exogenous (1   )
share of prot and pay an endogenous  share of cost. This constraint says that the expected gain of
25In this section, we allow the share of transfer cost  to be selected to obtain a simple solution for the optimal contract.
In our model,  is exogenously given, which is an endogenous variable in Antras, Desai and Foley (2009). They analyzed
how the share of prot and the share of cost are aected by the Southern investor protection. They showed that both are
high in the low protection case, and vice versa. Although their setting is more realistic, our setting is rich enough to analyze
the eect of Southern investor protection and the level of IPR protection on the growth rate.
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Southern entrepreneurs must be nonnegative. The nal constraint is an incentive compatibility constraint
of Southern entrepreneurs. The left-hand-side of this inequality is the benet of Southern entrepreneurs
when they choose to behave, and the right-hand-side is the benet of Southern entrepreneurs when they
choose to misbehave. This inequality must hold so that Southern entrepreneurs choose not to misbehave.
The rst constraint is always binding because excess investment leads to a high transfer cost, which
reduces the transfer gain. The second constraint is also always binding in our setting because the Northern
rm has an incentive that continues to decrease  if this inequality is strictly positive. Then  =
1   (1  ) (1  ) vM (t)
cF (t)
is satised. The third constraint is not binding when  is high enough, which
yields hFN (t) = 1n(t)F
FN (! (t)), hFS (t) = 1n(t)F
FS (! (t)) and cF (t) = vN (t)FFC (! (t)). These results
are the same as in the previous section. However, when  is low, the third constraint is binding, which
yields:
hFN (t) =
1
n (t)
F^FN ; F^FN  1
aM
1  
1  ; (30)
hFS (t) =
1
n (t)
F^FS ; F^FS 
"
1
1  b

(fF )
1 
  

b
1  b

1
aM
1  
1  
  1

# 
 1
; (31)
cF (t) = vN (t) F^FC (! (t)) ; F^FC (! (t)) 
8<: 1  1  N + ! (t)
"
1
1  b

(fF )
1 
  

b
1  b

1  
1  N
  1

# 
 1
9=; ;
(32)
where F^FN > FFN (! (t)), dF^
FN
d > 0, F^
FC (! (t)) > FFC (! (t)) and dF^
FC(!(t))
d > 0 are satised. There-
fore, when Southern investor protection is weak, more Northern laborers must be engaged in technology
transfer than the optimal hiring level that the third constraint is not binding in order for the Southern
entrepreneur not to misbehave, and therefore the cost of transfer is also higher than the optimal level.
We can easily verify that relaxing Southern investor protection (decreasing ) induces increasing hFN (t)
and cF (t). The other setting, except for the cost of transfer, is the same as in the previous section, which
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gives us the following equations:
(!)" 1
h
F^FC (!) + 1
i
= (1  ); (33)
g =
MN   (1  ) ("  1) 
F^FN + 1 + (1  ) ("  1) ; (34)
g =
MS   XS(!;; )
XN (!;; ) (1  ) ("  1) 
F^FS + X
S(!;; )
XN (!;; ) (1  ) ("  1)
; (35)
instead of (23), (27) and (28). These equations and (24) determine the equilibrium value of !, ,  
and g. As discussed in the previous section, strengthening IPR protection reduces the growth rate when
F^FN (!) is high. Then we get following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Strengthening IPR protection (decreasing ) induces a low growth rate when Southern
investor protection and the level of morality in the host country are weak.
5 Conclusion
We developed a product-cycle model with costly technology transfer that requires resources from the
North and South. We showed that whether strengthening IPR protection enhances growth or impedes
growth depends heavily on the size of the transfer cost. This result is not obtained in related studies
using a product-cycle model where the channel of technology transfer is FDI or licensing, because they
do not take into account the resource cost of technology transfer in both countries. If only Southern
labor is used in the transfer, shifts in production to the South always increase R&D activity in the
North. If only Northern labor is used in the transfer, the extreme point equilibrium can be realized
when the eciency of transfer is low. By reason of the above, our generalization of technology transfer
is meaningful. Moreover, we showed that the interior equilibrium is always saddle stable, which ensures
comparative statics meaningful.
In the extended model, we introduced a contract theory framework, which is usually analyzed in a
partial equilibrium model. Our general equilibrium model identied the eect of investor protection and
18
the level of morality in developing countries on the growth rate through the labor market; weaker investor
protection raises the monitoring cost, which wastes labor resource in the North and thus impedes R&D
activities. This eect cannot be caught in partial equilibrium models.
We showed that characteristics of developing countries aect transfer cost. However, another factor
aecting transfer cost is possible. Analyzing the various aspects of the transfer cost may yield interesting
interactions between strengthening IPR protection and economic growth. This is an important direction
for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 A1
In this appendix, we conrm the dierential calculus ofXN (!; ;  ) =
(1 )( "" 1 )
 "
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
and XS (!; ;  ) =
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
. As " > 1, ! < 1 are satised, we can easily
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show @X
N (!;; )
@! =
(" 1)(1 )( "" 1 )
 "h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
h
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
i2 > 0, @XN (!;; )@ =  (
"
" 1 )
 "h
(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
i
h
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
i <
0, X
N (";; )
@ =  
(1 )( "" 1 )
 "

h
 ( "" 1!)
1 "
+(!)1 "
i
h
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
i2 < 0 and @XS(!;; )@ = (
"
" 1 )
1 "h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
h
(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
+(1  )( "" 1!)
1 "
+ (!)1 "
i2 >
0. Since we can easily conrm 1
XS(!;; )
= (!)
" (1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 
+ !
(1  )( "" 1 )
1 "
+ 
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 
is increasing func-
tion of !, @X
S(!;; )
@! < 0 is satised. Since
@
@ 
(!)"(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 
=
(!)"(1 )( "" 1 )
1 "h ( "" 1!) " 1+(!) " 1ih
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 
i2 >
0 and @@ 

!
(1  )( "" 1 )
1 "
+ 
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 

=
!
h
 ( "" 1 )
1 "
+1
i
(1  )
h
( "" 1 )
 " ( "" 1 )
1 "ih
(1  )( "" 1 )
 "
+ 
i2 > 0 are satised, 1XS(!;; ) is
increasing function of  . Then @X
S(!;; )
@ < 0 is satised.
6.2 A2
In this appendix, we conrm the interior BGP equilibrium is saddle stable. Linearizing (19), (20), (21)
and (22) around the BGP equilibrium, we obtains:
0BBBBBBBBBB@
_ (t)
_ (t)
_ (t)
_! (t)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBB@
q11 q12 q13 q14
0 q22 0 0
q31 q32 q33 q34
0 0 0 q44
1CCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBB@
    (t)
     (t)
    (t)
!   ! (t)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
; (36)
where q11 =   1FFS(!)

MS  XS  1+FFN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@ +
 @X
N
@ < 0, q12 =   1+
FFN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@  +
 @X
N
@  < 0, q13 =  1+(t)F
FN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
XS+XN, q14 =
h
 @F
FN (!)
@!   1+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
@FFS(!)
@!
i
MS XS
FFS(!)  
1+FFN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@! + 
 @X
N
@! > 0, q22 =  M
S XS
FFS(!) =  g < 0, q31 =  @@
h
XN
(1 )(" 1)
i
+
 @X
N
@   F
FN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@ < 0, q32 = 
 @
@ 
h
XN
(1 )(" 1)
i
+  @X
N
@    F
FN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@  < 0, q33 =
XN
(1 )(" 1) +X
N   FFN (!)
FFS(!)X
S, q34 =
h
@FFN (!)
@!   @F
FS(!)
@!
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
i
MS XS
FFS(!)   F
FN (!)
FFS(!) 
 @XS
@! +
(1 )(" 1)+1
(1 )(" 1) 
 @XN
@! > 0 and q44 =
XN
(1 )(" 1) @FFC (!)
@!
h
("  1) (1  ) (!) " + @FFC(!)@!
i
> 0 are sat-
ised. We obtain characteristic equation of this matrix as (q22   ) (q44   )

2   (q11 + q33)+ q11q33   q13q31

=
0. Since q22 < 0 and q44 > 0 are satised, showing q11q33 q13q31 < 0 guarantees two positive eigen-values
and two negative eigen-values, which means that BGP equilibrium is saddle stable. Then we examine
_ (t) = 0 and _ (t) = 0 where ! and   satisfy (23) and (24) respectively. Since signs of q13 and q33
are ambiguous, we need to show q11q33   q13q31 =  q13q33

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

< 0 with all possible
combination of q13 and q33 satisfying 
  0 and   0.
First we consider the case of q13 > 0 and q33 > 0. Since q11q33 q13q31 =   q13|{z}
+
q33|{z}
+

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

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is satised, showing that the slope of _ (t) = 0 curve is greater than the sope of _ (t) = 0 curve
,

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

> 0, ensures q11q33 q13q31 < 0. 26 Since q33 = XN(1 )(" 1)+XN  F
FN (!)
FFS(!)X
S =
+MN FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS
 is satised, 
 < (
"
" 1 )
1 "
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i and +MN FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS >
0 should be satised. 27 Then _ (t) = 0 curve,  =
+MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S
1
(1 )(" 1)X
N (!;; ) FFN (!)
FFS(!)X
S(!;; )
, is  +
MN   FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS > 0 when  = 0 and +1 when  = (
"
" 1 )
1 "
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i .
Since q13 = 
XN    FFN (!)
FFS(!)X
S   XS =


MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S

  MS
FFS(!)
 is satised, 0 < 
 <
( "" 1 )
 " 
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i and  > MSFFS(!)
MN FFN (!)
FFS(!)M
S
> 0 should be satised. 28 Then
_ (t) = 0 curve,  =


MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S

  1
FFS(!)M
S

h
XN (!;; ) FFN (!)
FFS(!)X
S(!;; )  1
FFS(!)
XS(!;; )

i , is  1 when  = 0, 0
when  =
MS
FFS(!)
MN FFN (!)
FFS(!)M
S
and +1 when  = (
"
" 1 )
 " 
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i . There-
fore the dynamics is described in (; ) space as depicted in Figure 4. Since we can conrm that
the slope of _ (t) = 0 curve is greater than the sope of _ (t) = 0 curve ,

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

> 0,
q11q33   q13q31 =   q13|{z}
+
q33|{z}
+

 q11
q13

 

 q31
q33

| {z }
+
< 0 is satised.
26From (36), the slope of _(t) = 0 curve and _(t) = 0 curve are given by   q11
q13
and   q31
q33
respectively.
27Since X
N
(1 )(" 1) + X
N   F
FN (!)
FFS(!) X
S =

(1 )(" 1)+1
(" 1)

"
" 1
 " FFN (!)
FFS(!)

(1  )

"
" 1!
 "+ (!) "
(1 )

"
" 1
1 "
+(1  )

"
" 1!
1 "
+ (!)1 "
and (1  )

"
" 1
1 "
+(1   ) 

"
" 1!

1 "
+  (!)1 " > 0 are satised with   0, (1 
)(" 1)+1
(" 1)

"
" 1
 " 
FFN (!)
FFS(!)

(1   ) 

"
" 1!

 "
+   (!) "

> 0 is satised.
28Since XN    F
FN (!)
FFS(!) X
S   XS =


(1 )

"
" 1
 "  FFN (!)+FFS(!)
FFS(!)

(1  )

"
" 1!
 "+ (!) "
(1 )

"
" 1
1 "
+(1  )

"
" 1!
1 "
+ (!)1 "
and (1  )

"
" 1
1 "
+ (1   ) 

"
" 1!

1 "
+   (!)1 " > 0 are satised with   0,
(1  )

"
" 1
 "   FFN (!)+FFS(!)
FFS(!)

(1   )

"
" 1!

 "
+   (!) "

> 0 is satised when  > 0. From


MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!)M
S

  MS
FFS(!)
 > 0,
MS
FFS(!)
MN FFN (!)
FFS(!)M
S
should be positive with   0 and   0.
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Figure 4. Dynamics in (; ) space (the case of q13 > 0 and q33 > 0).
Second we consider the case of q13 < 0 and q33 < 0. Since q11q33 q13q31 =   q13|{z}
 
q33|{z}
 

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

is satised, showing that the slope of _ (t) = 0 curve is greater than the sope of _ (t) = 0 curve
,

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

> 0, ensures q11q33   q13q31 < 0. Since q33 = XN(1 )(" 1) +XN   F
FN (!)
FFS(!)X
S =
+MN FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS
 is satised, 
 > (
"
" 1 )
1 "
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i and +MN FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS <
0 should be satised. Then _ (t) = 0 curve is +1 when  = (
"
" 1 )
1 "
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
and 0 when  = +1. Since q13 = XN    F
FN (!)
FFS(!)X
S   XS =


MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S

  MS
FFS(!)
 is
satised,  >
( "" 1 )
 " 
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i and  > MSFFS(!)
MN FFN (!)
FFS(!)M
S
should be satised.
29 Then _ (t) = 0 curve is +1 when  = (
"
" 1 )
 " 
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i
( "" 1 )
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)
h
(1  )( "" 1!)
 "
+ (!) "
i and has positive
value when  = +1. Therefore the dynamics is described in (; ) space as depicted in Figure 5. 30 Since
we can conrm that the negative slope of _ (t) = 0 curve is smaller than the negative slope of _ (t) = 0
29Note that from q33 < 0, MN   F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S should be negative.
30This gure is depicted the case that

"
" 1
 " (1  ) "
" 1!
 "
+ (!) "


"
" 1
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)

(1  )

"
" 1!
 "
+ (!) "
 > 0 is satised. Of course, it is
possible that

"
" 1
 " (1  ) "
" 1!
 "
+ (!) "


"
" 1
 "
+
FFN (!)
FFS(!)

(1  )

"
" 1!
 "
+ (!) "
 < 0 is satised. Inthis case _ (t) = 0 curve is +1 when  = 0.
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curve,

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

> 0, q11q33   q13q31 =   q13|{z}
 
q33|{z}
 

 q11
q13

 

 q31
q33

| {z }
+
< 0 is satised.
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Figure 5. Dynamics in (; ) space (the case of q13 < 0 and q33 < 0).
Third we consider the case of q13 < 0 and q33 > 0. In this case, we can easily conrm q11|{z}
 
q33|{z}
+
  q13|{z}
 
q31|{z}
 
<
0.
Finally we consider the case of q13 > 0 and q33 < 0. On one hand, q33 =
+MN FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS
 < 0
should be satised. On the other hand q13 =


MN F
FN (!)
FFS(!) M
S

  MS
FFS(!)
 > 0 should be satised. How-
ever, 
h
MN   FFN (!)
FFS(!)M
S
i
  MS
FFS(!) cannnot be positive with 
 > 0 under +MN  FFN (!(t))
FFS(!(t))
MS <
0. Therefore the case of q13 > 0 and q33 < 0 does not occur in the equilibrium.
With above discussion we conrmed that q11q33 q13q31 =  q13q33

  q11q13

 

  q31q33

< 0 is satised
with all possible combination of q13 and q33. Then BGP equilibrium is saddle stable.
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